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INTRODUCTION 
It is a privilege and honor for me to make the concluding 
address of this excellent symposium on world agricultural trade. 
Ed Harshbarger and his colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City are certainly to be complimented for assembling such 
a distinguished group of participants, as well as a most impressive 
audience. Hopefully, the discussions of the past two days will 
stimulate and enhance world agricultural trade over the next two 
decades or more. 
Since the topic of this morning's program relates to the 
linkage of world food supply and demand, I will concentrate 
primarily on that topic. However, my talk will also deliberately 
spillover into the subject matter of yesterday's discussions. 
My intent will be to outline the basic issues of this symposium 
in a format that could be used for follow-up policy discussions 
in this or any other country. 
Though food policy is an area of study which contains few 
absolutes, it has at least one parameter with which most of us 
can agree - that worldwide supply and demand will be in equilibrium 
on relatively few occasions during the rest of this century. Five 
years ago we had a situation where demand outran supply, with 
rr~ny agricultural prices reaching their hignest levels ever. In 
contrast, at the end of last year's harvest we found the reverse 
situation to be extant. Worldwide supply had outrun demand, with 
Prices in eXD, or~l'nq countrl'es havl'ncr roached 1 ~.J -~ ~ - ~" vp- . s:: 1": .:=j~ r 
below production costs. 
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All of us hope these extremes can be avoided in the future, 
and many nations are taking steps individually, and perhaps 
collectively, to reduce the probability of widely fluctuating 
prices. Nevertheless, some imbalance is bound to 
occur, if for no other reason than that we still cannot control 
the weather. With the Soviet Union now being a major element in 
the world market situation, and with that nation being subject to 
extremes of both frost and drought, economic uncertainty will 
likely be the rule rather than the exception in the near term, if 
not the long term. If so, how then can we adjust to the supply-
demand imbalances that will inevitably occur? 
SUPPLY OUTRUNS DEMAND 
Let us deal first with the present situation, where supply 
has outrun effective demand. Obviously, there are a number of 
short-run steps that can be taken in such a situation, and also a 
number of longer term actions should the situation prove to be 
chronic (unlikely as that may be), rather than just temporary. I 
would like first to enumerate the short-run possibilities, since 
those are the policy issues which face both exporting and importing 
nations today. 
Short Run Actions 
1. Move The Product Into Consumption, Both Human And 
Livestock 
Nations should permit and encourage the responsiveness of 
their livestock and poultry industries- to situations such as the 
one which presently prevails. Regrettably, some nations isolate 
these industries from worldwide supply conditions in the grain 
and oil seeds sector, thereby minimizing, and sometimes even 
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precluding, a desirable expansion in those industries. Sf of 
course, deprives their consumer sector of an opportunity to 
expand consumption of these excellent protein foods, and it 
forces an inordinate level of adjustment in the livestock and 
poultry economies of "price responsive" nations. 
Whether or not an international trading nation has a market 
economy, it ought to pursue policies which will permit its livestock 
and poultry sectors to buffer the price and income blows that 
will otherwise be felt in their own grain and oilseeds industries, 
and in the grain, oilseeds, livestock and poultry industries of 
market economy nations with relatively open trading policies. 
This was a major element of the price instability which occurred 
in 1973 and 1974, and we ought to try to improve that situation 
in the future. 
Some adjustment in human consumption should occur as well. 
At a time of surplus production in the world, governments ought 
to reappraise policies which discourage food consumption, and 
which keep the percentage of per capita incomes expended for food 
at an inordinately high level. In other words, we ought to 
permit the price system to function in the consumer sector too, 
thereby increasing consumption levels as farm prices decline. 
2. Reduce Trade Barriers 
In times of surplus, nations should adjust trade barriers 
which will have an immediate conslli~ption response. Quota programs 
constitute perhaps the best example, since the import response 
to a quota increase is usually immediate. Many countries have 
quota programs which have little, if any 
- , economic justification, 
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and often a political justification that is long since obsolete. 
In those cases, they could contribute to the welfare of their own 
consumers, and substantially benefit exporting nations, by loosening 
their trade constraints permitting some of the agricultural surplus 
to flow in. 
3. Establish or Expand Storage Programs 
This can be done on either a national or international 
basis, or both, where non-perishable products are concerned. 
There are a good many nations in the world today which need to 
protect themselves further against food security risks. The 
surest way to do this is through an expansion in their own storage 
capacity. In terms of product cost, the ideal time to do this, 
of course, is when worldwide food surpluses exist. The product 
can be purchased at an attractive price, and (if necessary) simply 
stored in exporting nations until construction of new storage 
facilities in the buying country have been completed. 
This is also an ideal time to create and stock an international 
food reserve, if there be the political will among major exporting 
and importing nations to take such action. A well-coordinated 
international program certainly has advantages over ad hoc, 
unilateral efforts to establish storage programs in either exporting 
or importing nations. 
4. Expand Aid Programs 
Humanitarian considerations should be the primary motivation 
for taking these actions, either on a grant or long-term loan 
basis. The U.S. program which fills this need is, of course, 
P.L. 480, our "Food for Peace" effort. Other countries have 
similar programs, and all may appropriately be expanded during 
4 
times such as this, providing the expansion does not place undue 
strains on the distribution network and the agricultural production 
sector of recipient nations. There must clearly be a balancing 
of interests in this respect, lest the programs be counterproductive 
in the longrun, though they be helpful in the shortrun. With 
that caveat, however, it should be possible to find room for 
reasonable expansion of such programs in a year like 1977 or 
1978. Not only can this improve the nutritional levels of many 
hungry people, but it can also have longrun market development benefits. 
Surplus situations have often led to strident, unfair, and 
even irrational trade responses among competitive nations. This 
is particularly true among exporters, but it "takes two to tango" 
so importers are not entirely free from criticism. Perhaps the 
most widely used "throat cutting" mechanism in international trade 
is that of the export subsidy. When brought into action with all 
its fury, the export subsidy simply becomes a battle of federal 
treasuries. Such practices are extremely costly to the subsidizing 
exporters, many of whom are often developing countries which 
cannot afford it, and they provide an enormous income transfer to 
beneficiary importing nations. Though importers may temporarily 
gloat over such a result, the long term results may well prove to 
be detrimental, rather than beneficial. It would be well to 
avoid such non-competitive responses to a surplus situation, and 
at least discuss the policy options in a reasonably tranquil, 
multilateral atmosphere before embarking upon such actions. This 
is the advantage of an international agreement, with guidelines 
or triggers which will lead to such consultations. 
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5. Provide Farmers With Income Protection, Rather Than Price 
Protection 
If the price system is permitted to function, a surplus 
will move into consumption, farmers will adjust their production 
plans to the price signals that are received, and the unprofitable 
price levels will probably prove to be- temporary. At the same 
time, it certainly is desirable to provide farmers with a reasonable 
level of income protection. This can be done through target 
prices, as is the case here in the U.S., or through similar 
mechanisms that will not impede the supply adjustments that 
should take place. To achieve this objective a deficiency payment 
policy (such as that followed by the U.S. and a number of other 
countries) would seem to be infinitely preferable to high price 
support programs. 
6. Permit Currency Exchange Rates to Adjust as Market Conditions 
Dictate 
The world has not yet fully adjusted to its new monetary era 
involving floating exchange rates. As a consequence, some nations 
are still engaging in "dirty float" operations, which impede the 
adjustment in trade flows that would otherwise occur. This 
affects both industrial and agricultural trade, and can have a 
most detrimental income effect on exporting countries. An aggressive 
market development program by an exporter - a perfectly proper 
response to a surplus situation - will fail-ignominiously if such 
. 
an effort is offset by exchange rate manipulations within importing 
nations. 
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7. Reduce Production, Through a "Set Aside" or 
Comparable Program 
Programs to curb production will not be met with enthusiasm 
by importing nations, even in times of surplus. They will inevitably 
provoke criticism because of omnipresent malnutrition conditions 
in the world, which are only nominally affected by the availability 
of agricultural surpluses. This is a sensitive and delicate policy 
issue, with income distribution and other complex parameters 
beyond the scope of today's discussion. 
Notwithstanding the inevitable criticism, a set aside may 
well be the most feasible policy option to correct major supply-
demand imbalances in the short-run. With an inelastic supply and 
demand situation for most agricultural products, a set aside can 
have an immediate price response of substantial benefit to producers. 
Long Run Actions 
1. Reduce Or Eliminate Both Tariff And Non-Tariff 
Trade Barriers 
This is a multilateral exercise which has been traditionally 
conducted in "rounds" of negotiations; these rounds have been 
held every few years since the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (the GATT) was executed just after World War II. In the 
future, one must hope that worldwide trade problems will be 
confronted on a continuing basis, rather than in the stutter-step 
style that has prevailed in the past. If so, this should permit 
us to approach more closely the comparative advantage principle 
of international trade, which would be helpful not only in surplus 
supply situations, but in times of shortage as well. 
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2. Assist And Stimulate The Economic Development 
Efforts Of The Third World 
The growth area for international -trade in agricultural 
products lies in nations which will have both the population 
and the purchasing power to dramatically expand food consumption. 
To a very great degree, the nations fulfilling these criteria 
between now and the year 2000 will come primarily from the 
Third World. These are countries, particularly in the Far East 
and Latin America, which have the natural resources, the human 
resources, or both to advance to the IIdeveloped" group, or 
very near thereto. To the degree that we and other developed 
nations can help such countries to progress economically, we 
too will benefit therefrom. There should be a particularly 
strong motivation for agricultural exporting nations to 
assist in such endeavors, -because of the market potential that is 
involved, along with the laudable impact this will have on 
worldwide income distribution. 
There will be demand growth in the developed countries too, 
of course, and this should certainly not be ignored. But 
population growth has slowed in those parts of the world, and 
is not likely to alter substantially in the future. Therefore, 
the upgrading of diets in most countries will supply only limited 
growth potential in total food consumption. 'That desirable 
combination of population growth and purchasing power will 
likely emerge elsewhere in the world. 
3. Eliminate Exchange Rate Policies Which Impede Trade 
Importing nations sometimes maintain undervalued currencies 
in order to stimulate their own exports. This obviously is 
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inflationary, and it just as obviously reduces import volumes. 
Nevertheless, these nations are willing to pay that price in order to 
sustain and improve their own export potential. In the long 
run, however, this will prove to pe a shortsighted policy, and 
market forces will ultimately prevail. In a period of excess 
supplies, it would be in the long run-best interest of everyone 
to permit the currency market to operate without impediments. 
4. Follow Circumspect International Lending Practices 
There have been some incidents in recent years when 
international lending agencies have stimulated the production 
of agricultural products where surpluses had already driven 
prices to unprofitable levels. It may be that the loans were 
proper nonetheless. It is conceivable that competitive forces 
would call for the phasing out of production of that particular 
commodity in developed countries, and phasing in of production 
in one or more Third World countries. If so, the loan program 
cannot legitimately be criticized. 
If, on the other hand, the Third World investment would be 
non-competitive, even in the long run, then the loan was a mistake. 
It is certainly proper to ask that international lending organi-
zations examine their commodity loan practices with considerable 
care, and avoid adding to already existing surpluses wherever 
possible. 
5. Achieve Additional Stability Through The Use Of 
Long Term Contracts Or Futures Markets 
An individual nation, whether it be an importer or exporter, 
may take a number of unilateral steps to achieve greater price 
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stability. Some nations already do this through farm policies 
which isolate themselves from market conditions elsewhere in 
the world. I am by no means a proponent of such policies, for 
they simply force the burden of adjustment onto the shoulders 
of other nations. Furthermore, these policies are too often 
inflexible and thereby permanently distortive. 
In my opinion, there are at least two ways of achieving 
greater price and income stability in a particular nation, 
without forcing major adjustments on one's fellow trading 
partners. One way is through the use of long term contracts, 
particularly if (as would usually be the case) the contracts do 
not have fixed price provisions. Such contracts offer an exporting 
nation a certain degree of market security, while offering the 
importing partner a certain degree of supply security. Both 
benefit from this, aside from whether or not price protection is 
added to volume protection. 
A second method is through the use of futures markets. There 
are active futures markets available today in most of the major 
agricultural commodities, and many nations, agencies, and firms 
could avail themselves of the hedging opportunities that those 
markets provide. 
6. Support Research And Extension Programs To Reduce 
Costs And Increase Efficiency In The Agricultural Production 
And Marketing Processes Of All Nations 
In a long run surplus situation, there may be little that 
can be done to improve farm prices. But one may well be able 
to reduce production and marketing costs. If so, income levels 
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will improve throughout the entire agribusiness sector, notwith-
standing the adverse price situation. This is a time for the 
development of "cost reducing" technology, rather than "output 
_increasing" technology. The latter may well reduce the income 
levels in the agricultural sector, because of price inelasticity 
of demand. The former, on the other hand should boost incomes, 
thereby proving to be a most welcome investment under the 
circumstances. 
Now let us look at what many people believe to be the 
more likely scenario in future years - the specter of food 
shortages. There will be some duplication of measures for, 
interestingly, some apply both in times of shortage and of surplus. 
DEMAND OUTRUNS SUPPLY 
Short Run Actions 
1. Avoid "Beggar thy Neighbor" Policies Perhaps the greatest 
contribution that can be made toward the resolution of short-run 
food crises is an act of omission. That is, food surplus nations, 
such as the United States, should avoid export restraints and 
permit market forces to function. A time of food shortage is 
not a time in which to be selfish. It may, in fact, be a time 
which calls for actions beyond those afforded by the market. 
If only price is used to allocate food under such circumstances, 
the rich will eat and the poor will starve._ Therefore, it is 
incumbent upon rich countries, and rich people within poor 
countries, to share on a humanitarian basis with those in need. 
We have not always been this idealistic, in the United States 
or anywhere else. 
As I noted earlier, one of our major problems in "burden 
sharing" in the food sector is L~at market forces are impeded in 
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many portions of the world. This means that in a time of short-
age, as well as in a time of surplus, the livestock and poultry 
industries of some countries must bear an. undue share of the 
adjustment. Note, for example, the trauma experienced by the U.S. 
livestock industry in the food shortage period of 1973 and beyond. 
Permitting market forces to function will correct this inequity. 
2. Immediately Terminate Production Disincentives 
Many nations still maintain systems of production disincentives, 
though they are usually not denominated as such. Involved are 
national "cheap food" policies, designed-to garner the political 
and economic approval of the consumer sector. These policies are 
often shortsighted at best, and certainly indefensible in a 
period of food shortages. Under such circumstances, they ought 
to be altered or eliminated immediately. 
3. Provide Production Incentives Where Necessary 
In countries where market forces are permitted to work, 
such incentives may not be necessary. Attractive prices are 
likely to stimulate expanded usage of fertilizers, chemicals, 
and other inputs that will increase yields. In non-market 
economy countries, however, or in countries where the market 
system is not permitted to function to its fullest, governmental 
incentives may be essential. In such situations, nations 
should have stand-by policies to apply when 'short term food 
shortages have developed. 
4. Make Food Reserves Available 
Whether or not a formalized international food reserve 
is in existence, nations should make food reserves available 
to their own people, and hopefully to the world market as well. 
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At a time of shortage, the "triggers" of most food reserve 
programs should release automatically. In some cases, price 
movements will achieve such a result; in other cases, 
governmental action may be necessary. Reserves should move in 
to distribution, until such time as minimum carry-over levels are 
reached nationally and internationally. 
5. Reduce Waste 
We still waste tremendous quantities of food in the marketing 
process, particularly where perishables are involved. Though 
this is a never ending challenge, there are short run steps that 
countries and firms can take to reduce waste in a time of crisis. 
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6. Evaluate Exchange Rate Policies Even in an era of 
floating exchange- rates, one often discovers individual exchange 
rate policies which impede trade. These policies, whether they 
be deliberate or simply due to bureaucratic inertia, can easily 
lead to a beggar thy neighbor s~tuation when food supplies are 
short. This is not a time for "dirty float." Therefore, nations 
ought to adjust such policies so that they facilitate trade rather 
than impede it. 
7. Evaluate Fiscal And Monetary Policies The shortage of 
food supplies will have an inflationary impact on national economies, 
and this impact will be dramatic. Because food is purchased on a 
daily or weekly basis, and since most housewives make those pur-
chases in cash, food price increases are immediately noticed and 
immediately felt. The reverberations from this will quickly pene-
trate the entire economy. This is a phenomenon that was experienced 
by all of us in 1973 and 1974. At such a time, it would be well for 
nations to examine their total fiscal and monetary policies to deter-
mine whether they are further accelerating inflation. Should those 
policies be over-heating a given economy, they should be adjusted 
to minimize the adverse impact in the consumer sector. 
Long Run Actions 
Finally, perhaps the most penetrating concern of all - and 
certainly the most worrisome to everyone of us - is that of long-
run food shortages. All of us have seen population projections where 
normal food needs exceed any reasonable estimate of food suppy 
availability a half century or a century in the future. The Mal-
thusian model seems to be hovering on the horizon. To date we 
have kept it hovering, but no one knows when it might ultimately 
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become a reality. What then can we do to stave it off for a few 
more decades, ox perhaps even indefinitely? 
1. Restrain The Growth of Population 
This is an obvious answer, oft discussed, so there is no 
need in dwelling upon it here. Population can be restrained in 
any given country, even among those in the lesser developed cate-
gory. The successful programs are there for anyone to see. The 
real public policy question is whether a given nation is prepared 
to embark upon such a sensitive and often politically controversial 
program. If so, progress can be made; if not, unless that nation 
is ~ major agricultural producer or has wealth borne of other re-
sources, it will have to take other painful public policy steps 
to deal with its long range food supply requirements. Few nations 
can tolerate indefinitely - politically, let alone economically -
the impact of a 3.5% population growth rate. Therefore, as a 
practical matter, population control programs will become impera-
tive in many of the nations of the world. 
2. Stimulate Production 
Another obvious response, with many ways for doing so. Crop 
yields have risen dramatically in the twentieth century, and there 
is no reason to believe they will do otherwise in the twenty-first 
century. But we have had significant technological breakthroughs 
(hybrid corn, e.g.) which have contributed to the plentiful food 
supplies of recent years. There are some who believe that break-
throughs of a comparable magnitude during the next century are not 
likely to occur. If they are correct, we could have difficult 
times ahead. This means that agricultural research should receive 
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a high priority in the U.S. and other major agricultural producing 
nations of the world. It means further that existing technology 
should be transmitted to producers in the most effective way pos-
sible. This will require extension programs much more comprehensive 
in their geographic and human coverage than has been true in the 
past. Management techniques will need to be improved too, so that 
more farmers will begin to exceed the yield averages which prevail 
in the world today. 
In addition, efficient producers must be rewarded for their 
efforts. In the U.S. we have found the profit incentive to be a 
tremendous stimulus to production. If other countries wish to 
substitute differing incentives, that is their privilege. In the 
absence of such incentives, however, the necessary production in-
creases simply will not occur. 
Farmers in the U.S. and elsewhere also need a reasonable 
level of protection on the downside. It takes a great deal of 
talent and experience to manage and operate the modern farm of 
today. It is a tremendous waste of human resources to have that 
talent disappear from the agricultural scene in a sea of financial 
woes. I certainly do not advocate insurance against failure, in 
agriculture of any other enterprise. But we can moderate the 
financial impact of unpredictable and perhaps even uninsurable 
risks in the agricultural sector of any nation. This can be done 
through the use of target prices, governmental crop insurance pro-
grams, etc. Reasonable protections of this nature can pay big 
dividends in maintaining stability in agriculture. 
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3. Assist Lesser Developed Nations With Food Production 
Potential 
There is still substantial potential for dramatic increases 
in food production among a number of the lesser developed nations. 
For example, the llanos of South America, a gigantic region, could 
be operated much more intensively than it is today. But there are 
myriad problems involved in bringing these and other such lands 
anywhere near to full production. The capital requirements alone 
far exceed the discretionary financial resources presently avail-
able to these countries. Therefore, major international lending 
endeavors will be essential to their agricultural development. 
Not only will massive infusions of capital be required for 
production inputs, but the infrastructure (roads, powerlines, 
waterwells, etc.) will have to be there too. Without these, agricul-
tural development projects are doomed to failure. 
4. Foster Economies of Scale and Production and Marketing 
Efficiencies 
Few nations of the world today even approach the economies of 
scale that are possible in modern agriculture. In many cases, this 
reflects deliberate public policies based on social considerations. 
One cannot criticize such policies, for nations are entitled to 
establish their own priorities. But the trade-offs involved should 
at least be understood. 
One critical trade-off is that agricultural production will 
assuredly not be as efficient, profitable, and probably not as pro-
ductive as it would be if agricultural innovations, economies of 
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scale and other production and marketing efficiencies were emphasized. 
If and when food shortages become a chronic global problem, these 
nations may wish to reassess their priorities. The trade-offs may 
become too costly, wherein economic considerations may ultimately 
outweigh those in the social sphere. 
5. Reduce Trade Barriers 
You will recall that I advocated a reduction in trade barriers 
in times of agricultural surpluses. I do so in times of shortage 
as well. Under the latter condition, one can simply not justify 
impediments to the free movement of agricultural goods throughout 
the world. Though trade barriers have been reduced over the past 
thirty years, much more progress has been made in industry than in 
the agricultural sector. Agricultural barriers abound, and all 
nations need to reassess their own agricultural protectionism in 
light of projected world food needs in the coming decades. 
Putting it another way, the GATT rules on agricultural trade 
need to be strengthened, delineated with greater specificity, and 
applied with diligence and decisiveness. Present GATT rules come 
close to institutionalizing the beggar thy neighbor policies of 
agricultural trade barriers, rather than reducing or eliminating 
them. In the jargon of international trade, we ought to be able 
to do a much better job of "rationalizing" th~ international move-
ment of agricultural commodities. 
6. Resolve The Present Energy Crisis 
Neither the U.s. nor any other consuming nation has yet to 
fully face up to the energy crisis. unless we are prepared to do 
so, in a variety of ways, that crisis will be with us for many 
18 
years to come. It may be grammatically imperfect to speak of 
a "chronic" energy crisis, but that is precisely what we will 
have. 
If this condition prevails, it will clearly impinge upon 
the world's ability to feed itself. At the economic margin, 
all nations must make a choice between energy and food. Since 
the emergence of the energy crisis, that choice has been forced 
in the direction of energy. For us and the other wealthier nations 
of the world the choice is distressing, but tolerable. But for 
many of the poorer nations of the world, it is exceedingly painful, 
and could ultimately lead to much higher levels of malnutrition. 
The answer must be a concerted and deternined effort to develop 
alternative sources of energy at the earliest possible date. 
7. Expand Storage Capacity 
Many importing nations, including the Soviet Union, have 
significantly expanded their storage capacity (particularly for 
grains) in recent years. This is a laudable objective, and should 
be further pursued in the years ahead. Notwithstanding my earlier 
point about export restraints, and the likelihood that most nations 
will seek to avoid such, in a crisis all bets are off. In other 
words, in a disaster situation where an exporting nation must 
choose whether to feed its own people, or share its food with the 
rest of the world, no government will be able to ignore the basic 
needs of its own citizens. Thus, it behooves all importing nations 
to maintain a reasonable level of food stocks at all times. Deter-
mination of that level is somewhat subjective, or course, for there 
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are trade-offs between cost and security. Nevertheless, my own 
judgement is that some importing nations ha:ve~traditionally main-
tained stocks at a dangerously low level. That is a policy they 
may wish to reassess in the future. 
8. Use Long-Term Contracts and Futures Markets 
Finally, importing nations can avail themselves of innova-
tive purchase techniques that can contribute to their own food 
security. Among those techniques are long-term contractual commit-
ments or the purchase of commodities on futures markets. Though 
these modes of operation cannot provide iron clad assurances of 
delivery, they are certainly preferable to placing oneself at the 
mercy of unpredictable supply and demand conditions, and they 
may be much less costly than alternative protections such as storage 
programs. 
Long-term contractual commitments, such as the one involving 
the U.s. and the Soviet Union, can bring additional stability to 
the food supply-demand relationships of the contracting nations, 
though it is possible that such arrangements will create additional 
instability elsewhere in the world. That is, the micro and macro 
effects may be dissimilar, but it surely is both desirable and 
proper for an individual nation to seek certain protections in its 
own long-term supply needs. Any .adverse macro effects should be 
dealt with on a multilateral basis. 
Futures markets may well provide an even more responsive and 
less confining method of achieving such protection than will long-
term contractual arrangements. Both mechanisms are certainly deserv-
ing of consideration by public and private entities of all the major 
food trading nations. 
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CONCLUSION 
Much more could be said. This is by no means a composite 
of all the actions, long term and short term, that can be 
taken by governments, quasi public agen~ies, and the private 
sector to deal with either food shortages or food surpluses. 
But I hope I have enumerated the major ones. Few of them 
are without controversy. But food policy is too important to 
have them be otherwise. 
Let us have the debates, nationally and internationally, 
and then move forward with policies that are reasonable, rational, 
and responsive. 
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